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Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock Rights?:
A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan
Albert W. Alschulert
and Stephen J. Schulhofertt
Over the opposition of most of the African American Alder-
men who voted on the issue,' the Chicago City Council enacted an
"anti-gang" loitering ordinance in 1992.2 In subsequent litigation,
the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court both
ruled unanimously that the ordinance's sweeping, ill-defined
terms rendered it void for vagueness.' The United States Su-
preme Court now has granted certiorari to review the Illinois Su-
preme Court's decision invalidating the ordinance.4
Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan contend that the ordinance is
sufficiently clear and that the Illinois courts should have deferred
to the judgments that prevailed in the political arena.5 They say
that "residents of poor, minority neighborhoods favor Chicago's
gang loitering ordinance,"6  and they excoriate judges for
"[i]gnoring the reality of this support."7 Yet they never offer any
evidence to justify their frequently repeated claim that this "re-
ality" exists.8 The truth is that the anti-loitering ordinance was
t Wilson-Dickinson Professor of Law and Arnold and Frieda Shure Scholar, Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School.
II Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Studies in Criminal
Justice, University of Chicago Law School. We are grateful for discussions with Michael
Dawson and Gerald Rosenberg and for the research assistance of C. Ben Foster and Ethan
Heinz. After this article was written, Professor Schulhofer, together with Professors Ran-
dall Kennedy and Randolph Stone, filed a brief amici curiae in the United States Supreme
Court, opposing the Chicago ordinance on behalf of the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood
Safety, US Representative Jesse Jackson, Jr., the Black Leadership Forum, local Chicago
chapters of the NAACP, and other Chicago community organizations. Brief amicus curiae
in Support of Respondents, Chicago v Morales, 118 S Ct 1510 (1998) (No 97-1121).
See notes 20-22, 25-29 and accompanying text.
Chicago Municipal Code § 8-4-015 (1992).
Chicago v Youkhana, 660 NE2d 34 (111 App 1995); Chicago v Morales, 687 NE2d 53
(IMl 1997), cert granted, 118 S Ct 1510 (1998).
118 S Ct 1510 (1998).
Tracey L. Meares and Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Think-
ing: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U Chi Legal F 197.
SId at 211.
Id at 199.
See id at 198 (referring to "innovative community policing measures these [inner-
city] citizens desire"); id at 198-99 ("curfews, loitering laws, loitering with intent, order
maintenance policing.., each enjoys high levels of support among members of minority
communities'); id at 210 ("residents of the inner city prefer relatively mild gang-loitering
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intensely controversial, that no one view can be attributed to
"residents of the inner city" or to "the [minority] community,"9
and that to the extent one can identify any predominant view,
Chicago's anti-loitering ordinance was opposed by the very groups
that Meares and Kahan identify as its principal supporters.
Similar flaws affect Meares and Kahan's account of the de-
terminative legal issues. They simply do not discuss the serious
defects that led the Illinois courts to hold the ordinance unconsti-
tutional. The case they build for the ordinance seems plausible
only because their discussion omits many crucial facts. On virtu-
ally every essential point, the picture they paint is incorrect or
seriously misleading.
In Part I of this article, we describe the origins of the Chicago
ordinance and African American opposition to it. In Part II, we
address Meares and Kahan's bold but unsupported and unsup-
portable claim that minority interests were adequately protected
by the political process. In Part Ill, we discuss the ordinance it-
self and the vague provisions that led the Illinois courts to hold
the law invalid under the due process clause.
Like Meares and Kahan, we believe that there are larger is-
sues in this debate, and we turn to those issues in Part IV. The
most important of these issues is not, as they claim, the need for
an "updated conception of rights."" It is instead the need for citi-
zens and courts to be on guard against the appealing but highly
manipulable rhetoric of "community," a rhetoric that is increas-
ingly prevalent in contemporary discourse. It is easy to appreci-
ate the attractions of a sense of place, shared values, and neigh-
borhood empowerment - the aspirations that communitarian
arguments compellingly evoke. But before we agree with Meares
and Kahan "not to second guess the [inner-city] community's de-
termination that [anti-loitering] measures enhance rather than
detract from liberty,"" we must, at a minimum, be sure that this
"community" exists and that it holds the views attributed to it.
At the intersection of politics, crime, police discretion, and
race lie problems of enormous complexity and explosiveness. Any
and curfew laws"); id (stating that there is "compelling reason not to second guess the
[inner-city] community's determination that [gang-loitering ordinances] enhance rather
than detract from liberty"); id at 211'("residents of poor, minority neighborhoods favor
Chicago's gang loitering ordinance"). Each of these claims rests on nothing more than the
authors' unsupported opinions, and there is a large body of readily available evidence to
the contrary.
Compare note 8.
10 Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 211 (cited in note 5).
Id at 210.
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responsible treatment of the issues demands research and careful
discussion, not beguiling nostrums and rosy but unexamined as-
sumptions. Meares and Kahan's analysis of the Chicago anti-
loitering ordinance demonstrates the dangers of their approach.
Far from serving the needs of the disadvantaged, the concept of
community can, in the wrong hands, become another weapon for
perpetuating the disempowerment and discrimination that con-
tinue to haunt urban America.
I. THE POLITICAL ANATOMY OF CHICAGO'S ANTI-LOITERING
ORDINANCE
Concerned by the increasing presence of gangs like the
"Spanish Cobras" in their neighborhoods, the Northwest Neigh-
borhood Federation, a community group based in a predomi-
nantly white section of Chicago, formed an Anti-Gang Task
Force. Starting in early 1991, the group spent over a year re-
searching and negotiating with city officials about anti-gang leg-
islation.12 Two northwest side Council members, Aldermen Bi-
alczak and Banks, "worked hand-in-hand with [the Federation's]
research committee to develop [the] ordinance" proposed to the
City Council. 3 Their wards, the 30th and 36th, were respectively
78 percent and 85 percent white. 4
In an effort to portray the anti-loitering ordinance as a
measure welcomed by minority communities, Meares and Kahan
assert that the ordinance originated with Chicago's African
American residents. They write, "In response to voluminous citi-
zen complaints ... Alderman William Beavers, the representa-
tive of a predominantly black ward... sought to introduce [the]
ordinance... in 1992."" This account is inaccurate. Beavers, as
chair of the relevant City Council committee, forwarded the draft
ordinance to the full Council after his committee held hearings on
it in the spring of 1992. The proposal had been introduced six
months earlier, mainly by white Aldermen with the support of
the mayor and his administration.
As reported by the Chicago Tribune, the "measure [was] first
proposed by Alderman William Banks (36th) [who is white] last
12 Chicago City Council Committee of Police and Fire, Transcript of Proceedings 30-
32 (May 18, 1992).
Id at 31.
City of Chicago, Department of Planning and Development, Population by Race
and Latino Origin for Census Tracts, Community Areas, and Wards 1980, 1990 24, Table 8
(1993) ("Population by Race").
" Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 199 (cited in note 5).
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year [in 1991]. "16 Another Tribune news story provided additional
detail:
The proposed [anti-loitering ordinance and a proposed cur-
few ordinance] were submitted to the City Council by four
pro-[Daley] administration aldermen: Michael Wojcik
(35th), William Banks (36th), and Carole Bialczak (30th),
all from the [predominantly white] Northwest Side, and
Lemuel Austin (34th) [a Black alderman] of the Far South
Side .... Wojcik... drew up the two draft ordinances
with the help of the [predominantly white] Northwest
Neighborhood Federation community organization and the
city law department.... 1
A later Tribune account described the ordinance as "drawn
up by several white aldermen and enthusiastically endorsed by
Mayor Richard Daley.""5 In sum, white Aldermen and their con-
stituents took the lead in initiating the anti-loitering proposal,
with strong backing and drafting assistance from the Daley ad-
ministration.
Once proposed, the ordinance drew support from some mi-
nority residents, many of them frustrated by the lack of adequate
police protection in their neighborhoods. 9 Meares and Kahan
stress minority-group support for the anti-loitering ordinance and
make no mention of African American opposition to it. Yet the
reaction in much of the black community was emphatically nega-
tive.20 The Chicago chapter of the NAACP denounced the pro-
16 John Kass, Old tactic sought in crime war, Chi Trib Al (May 15, 1992).
"? Robert Davis and William Recktenwald, Angry aldermen target gangs; Daley backs
City Council call for extra police powers, Chi Trib Al (Oct 24, 1991).
8 Robert Davis, New police arrest power lights City Council fuse, Chi Trib Al (June
18, 1992).
" That problem led to the underenforcement of existing laws. At the hearings on the
proposed ordinance, Chicago Police Deputy Superintendent Gerald Cooper testified that
"there are already enough laws on the books at this point, criminal laws, criminal penal-
ties which are much different than the ones that are articulated in the ordinance .... [I1n
the examples that people have been giving,... 90 percent of those instances are actually
criminal offenses where people, in fact, can be arrested." Chicago City Council, Transcript
of Proceedings at 181-182 (cited in note 12). On the common phenomenon of underen-
forcement in the black community of laws intended to promote security and public order,
see Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime and the Law 76-135 (Pantheon 1997).
No pollster has counted, but for every D'Ivory Gordon, the resident of Chicago's 7th
Ward quoted at the outset of the Meares and Kahan article, there may have been one or
more Joan Suglish's. Suglish, a 54-year-old who raised six children in an inner-city
neighborhood, declared, "When kids reach a certain age they hang around on street cor-
ners. I sure wouldn't like my children taken to a police station for hanging around."
Kevin Johnson, Chicago's new gang ordinance creates concern, USA Today 5A (July 8,
1992) (also quoting critical comments by several other inner-city residents including a 20-
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posal,2' as did the editorial page of Chicago's leading African
American newspaper, the Chicago Defender.22
City Council debate on the ordinance was intense and ra-
cially divisive. A Chicago Sun-Times headline noted that the Al-
dermen were "[bitterly [slplit."' The Tribune described the pro-
ceedings as "one of the most heated and emotional council de-
bates in recent memory."24 African American Aldermen opposed
to the ordinance said it was "'drafted to protect the downtown
area and the white community' at the expense of innocent
blacks' and that under the ordinance "[y]ou're guilty until
proven innocent."2s One African American alderman, a former
police officer, warned that the law would be "ineffective and sub-
ject to potential police abuse."27 Some of the black Aldermen ex-
pressed their concerns in highly emotional terms. One said,
"What did Hitler do to the Jews? The same thing."8 Another
denounced the law as "anti-American and anti-African American
- the Willie Horton of Chicago" and argued that the ordinance
would "restrict the movement of young blacks in a manner simi-
lar to the pass laws of South Africa [under Apartheid]." 9
African American concerns about the ordinance carried
weight with thoughtful mainstream spokesmen. Both of the
city's leading newspapers, the Tribune and the Sun-Times, con-
demned the proposal. The Tribune acknowledged that "Chicago
residents... feel trapped in their homes because of the fear of
gang violence" but noted "genuine concern that the ordinance
would invite police abuses." It concluded that "if [residents] ex-
pect that this new ordinance will make their streets safe, they are
bound to be disappointed... ."o The Sun-Times was more em-
year-old college student worried about being arrested because she did not know enough
about gang colors to avoid wearing them).
2 Davis and Recktenwald, Angry aldermen target gangs, Chi Trib at Al (cited in note
17).
= Editorial, Supreme Court should squash anti-gang ordinance, Chi Defender 11
(April 23, 1998) (condemning the ordinance and noting the paper's earlier editorial stands
against it).
Fran Spielman, Loitering Ban Passes: Aldermen Bitterly Split On Anti-Gang
Measure, Chi Sun-Times 1 (June 18, 1992).
24 Davis, New police arrest power, Chi Trib at 14 (cited in note 18).
Spielman, Loitering Ban Passes, Chi Sun-Times at 1 (cited in note 23) (remarks of
Alderman John Steele).
Id at 1 (remarks of Alderman Dorothy Tillman).
Id (remarks of Alderman Virgil Jones).
Id at 1 (remarks of Alderman Allan Streeter).
Spielman, Loitering Ban Passes, Chi Sun-Times at 1, 16 (cited in note 23) (remarks
of Alderman Dorothy Tillman).
Editorial, Anti-gang law isn't the answer, Chi Trib A16 (May 20, 1992).
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phatic, comparing City Council supporters of the ordinance to
"the likes of George III and the tyrants of Beijing" and concluding
that "[t]he proposed city ordinance to ban loitering by 'known
gang members' is too vague, too unworkable and, above all, too
unconstitutional."3'
In the final vote, the ordinance passed by a wide margin,
thirty-one to eleven.2 As Meares and Kahan note, some African
American aldermen did support it. Six (out of a total of eighteen)
voted in favor. But Meares and Kahan do not mention that eight
African American aldermen voted no.33 The claim that "residents
of poor, minority neighborhoods favor Chicago's gang loitering
ordinance"' 4 is oversimplified and misleading. 5
" Editorial, Put Permanent Hold on Anti-Loitering Law, Chi Sun-Times 37 (May 20,
1992).
' Official Journal of Proceedings, City of Chicago 18293 (June 17, 1992).
The racial identity of the opponents is noted in Fran Spielman, Anti-Gang Law
Won't Be Abused, City Says, Chi Sun Times 10 (June 19, 1992). Among the thirty-one
Aldermen who voted yes, the African Americans were Toni Preckwinkle, William M. Bea-
vers, Lorraine L. Dixon, Ed H. Smith, Carrie M. Austin and Percy Z. Giles. Among the
four black Aldermen who did not vote, at least one, Allan Streeter, was a vocal opponent of
the proposal. See note 28 and accompanying text.
Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 211 (cited in note 5).
A recent but more ambiguous measure of African American views is a vote in May
1998 on a City Council resolution asking the United States Supreme Court to uphold the
ordinance. The resolution passed by a vote of twenty-five to eight, and Aldermen repre-
senting predominantly African American wards split eight to five in favor of the resolu-
tion. Official Journal of Proceedings, City of Chicago 70134-35 (May 20, 1998). If one
were to accord this vote the same weight as the original vote to approve the ordinance, the
political situation would pose a puzzling problem under Meares and Kahan's demand "not
to second guess the [minority] community's determination .... Meares and Kahan, 1998
U Chi Legal F at 210 (cited in note 5). Their approach might require courts to rule that an
ordinance, unconstitutional when initially adopted, became valid when resolutions of
support or public opinion polls registered the necessary degree of approval. But the valid-
ity of the ordinance could then be thrown into question whenever resolutions of opposition
or public opinion polls revealed a reversal in prevailing sentiment in the relevant commu-
nity.
These complexities aside, the significance of the May 1998 resolution is unclear. It
was presented, apparently without notice or debate, when Alderman Banks "moved to
Suspend the Rules Temporarily for... immediate consideration," Official Journal of Pro-
ceedings, City of Chicago 70134, at a time when more than a third of the Council members
(seventeen Aldermen) were either absent or unwilling to vote. The support from eight
African American Aldermen was significant but less than a majority: nineteen African
American Aldermen serve on the 1998 City Council. The political situation can best be
described as one of substantial dissensus among African American voters. To date the
ordinance has never commanded the support of a majority of the African American Coun-
cil members.
In a further effort to demonstrate public support for the ordinance, Mayor Daley
launched a campaign to collect signatures on petitions asking the Supreme Court to up-
hold the constitutionality of the ordinance. See City seeks support for anti-gang law, Chi
Trib 5 (May 9, 1998). As of July 16, 1998, more than 14,000 people had signed the peti-
tions. Andrew Martin, Daley defends gang-loitering crackdown, Chi Trib 3 (July 16,
1998). The City is presumably continuing to accumulate additional signatures. In light of
the active efforts of City officials to collect such signatures, public support at this level is
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II. RACE, POLITICS, AND THE POLICE
Like Meares and Kahan's account of the adoption of the anti-
loitering ordinance, their broader claim of racial progress in
American politics paints an overly optimistic and fundamentally
misleading picture. The authors note that America now has more
registered black voters, more black officials, and more black po-
lice officers than it did in the 1960s. As they observe, some of our
greatest cities - New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago among
them - once had black mayors. Meares and Kahan contend that
"given the political strength of African Americans,"3 courts
"should relax their individualist distrust of community judg-
ments." 7 There is now, they say, "a compelling reason not to sec-
ond-guess" the results of the political process.38
These claims are too simple, as Chicago's recent political his-
tory makes clear. Harold Washington, the only African American
ever to win popular election as Mayor of Chicago,39 gained office
in 1983 after a split in the Democratic Party machine produced a
three-way race in both the Democratic primary and the general
election.' Washington served most of his tenure without control-
ling the City Council, where twenty-nine of the fifty seats were
firmly in the hands of anti-Washington (predominantly white)
Aldermen led by Edward Vrdolyak.4 The resulting "Council
Wars" prompted the Chicago Tribune to protest the "paralysis"
gripping city government and the Wall Street Journal to describe
Chicago as "Beirut on the Lake." 2 Mayor Washington was un-
able to gain passage for his budget; the Vrdolyak faction voted it
down and enacted their own instead.43 After three years of chaos,
a 1986 federal-court redistricting order and a new aldermanic
of little help in assessing community sentiment in a city of 2.8 million people. See City of
Chicago, Population by Race at 24 (cited in note 14).
Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 209 (cited in note 5).
Id.
Id at 210.
Following Washington's death in 1987, the City Council chose another African
American, Eugene Sawyer, to serve as mayor until the next popular election in 1989.
However, Sawyer's selection was engineered by the predominantly white Democratic
"machine," and his candidacy was opposed by most black aldermen. In the 1989 popular
election, Richard M. Daley was elected mayor by an overwhelming margin. See William J.
Grimshaw, Bitter Fruit: Black Politics and the Chicago Machine, 1931-1991 197-206 (Chi-
cago 1992).
Id at 176-78, 179-82.
41 Id at 184.
42 Id at 185-86.
43 Grimshaw, Bitter Fruit at 185.
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election produced a 25-25 split in the City Council.44 With his
right to cast the tie-breaking vote, Washington finally gained
fragile control. He died in office eighteen months later, and con-
trol of Chicago's city government soon returned to the predomi-
nantly white faction within the city's Democratic Party.45 The
notion that the election of a black mayor can be taken as signal-
ing the end of racism in urban politics is too sanguine.
The same sort of complexities exist elsewhere. Despite in-
creases in black voter registration in the South and despite dra-
matic increases in the number of black elected officials, there is
no basis for assuming that the days of institutional racism are
behind us.
Meares and Kahan appear to argue that because matters
were considerably worse in the past, close judicial scrutiny of
legislation aimed primarily at minority neighborhoods is no
longer needed. This is an obvious nonsequitur. The fact (if it is a
fact) that matters were worse in the past hardly suggests that all
serious problems have evaporated. Indeed, it is not even clear
that blacks have more political power today than they did in the
1960s. University of Chicago political scientist Michael Dawson
notes that the black community was a crucial constituency for the
Democratic Party in the 1960s and 1970s. More recently, how-
ever, "[t]he successful distancing from African Americans by the
Clinton campaign [and other Democrats] was considered an es-
sential component of their success."46 As a result of the "shift to
the right and the marginalization of African Americans," Dawson
concludes that recent developments "have disrupted black politi-
cal aspirations and weakened black power since the end of the
civil rights and black power eras.
Even if African Americans were as fully represented in the
political process as the rest of us, they would remain a "discrete
and insular minority" in most American jurisdictions. Accord-
ingly, they would remain the potential victims of majority imposi-
tion and discrimination. Contrary to Meares and Kahan's sug-
gestion, eliminating the disenfranchisement of a political minor-
ity does not diminish the need for other safeguards. Voting rights
and civil liberties are not fungible. Even more than the white
majority, African Americans need both.
" Id at 189.
Id at 197.
Michael C. Dawson, Black Power in 1996 and the Demonization of African Ameri-
cans, 29 PS: Political Sci & Politics 456,458 (1996).
' Id at 457, 460 (emphasis added).
B DRB0 K R/TGHTS23
Meares and Kahan's observation that black representation in
the United States House of Representatives increased from 3 per-
cent prior to 1973 to 9 percent in 199148 underscores this point:
blacks remain underrepresented politically, and even full political
representation would not end their potential vulnerability to op-
pressive legislation. Nine percent is substantially short of pro-
portional representation, and even 14 percent - the proportional
number - would be substantially short of a majority. That is
why Newt Gingrich, not Maxine Waters, is Speaker of the House,
and why the political gains of racial minorities do not diminish
the need for judicial review of legislation targeted at minority
neighborhoods.
The Meares and Kahan discussion of racist police behavior
rests on another nonsequitur. By stressing how bad things were
in the past and remaining silent about the abuses that persist,
Kahan and Meares persuade themselves that judicial vigilance
can be reduced. But police racism cannot be dismissed as a relic
of the past.
Recent news stories have described the gleeful racist boasts
of Mark Fuhrman in his taped conversations with a screen
writer,9 and the serious injury inflicted by the New York City po-
lice officers who sodomized a black man with the handle of a toi-
let plunger in the backroom of a stationhouse. ° Our newspapers
have reported police scandals in Philadelphia and other cities in
which officers have planted evidence and committed perjury in
cases involving African American suspects." Americans have
witnessed on videotape the police beating of Rodney King and
have heard on audiotape a participant's enthusiastic, racist de-
scription of the incident. A state-court jury's failure to convict the
participants in the King beating triggered "the bloodiest, most
Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 207 (cited in note 5).
' See Lawrence Schiller and James Wilwerth, American Tragedy: The Uncensored
Story of the Simpson Defense 557-58 (Random House 1996); Jeffrey Toobin, The Run of
His Life: The People v. O.J. Simpson 404-06 (Random House 1996).
See Dan Barry, Charges of Brutality: The Overview: Officer Charged in Man's
Torture at Station House, NY Times A6 (Aug 14, 1997).
" See Don Terry, 7 Chicago Police Officers Indicted in Extortion Scheme, NY Times
A12 (Dec 21, 1996) (reporting charges of extortion and evidence planting in an African
American neighborhood in Chicago and noting, "[Last year a] half-dozen Philadelphia
police officers were sentenced to prison for planting evidence, lying in court, robbing and
extorting people in a largely poor and black section of the city .... One [of more than 50]
overturned conviction[s] was that of a 54-year-old grandmother who spent three years in
prison because Philadelphia officers planted drugs in her home and lied about it in
court.").
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destructive American riot in the twentieth century."52 The jury's
action and the ensuing loss of fifty-eight lives came a little more
than one month before the enactment of Chicago's anti-loitering
ordinance.
Despite some progress in hiring and promoting black police
officers,53 study after study confirms that abuses of police discre-
tion, especially in dealing with African Americans, remain with
us. The Christopher Commission, formed to investigate the Los
Angeles Police Department's responsibility for the Rodney King
affair, reported in 1992 that "the problem of excessive force [was]
aggravated by racism,"'4 and that "racial contempt for blacks (and
other colored people) ... clearly infused the organizational cul-
ture of the LAPD."55 In a May 1998 editorial, the New York
Times opined, "The weakness of the New York City Police De-
partment's internal system for investigating and punishing mis-
conduct by police officers is an established fact."56 Two leading
police experts, Hubert Williams and Patrick Murphy, have
warned:
[A]lthough the police are better prepared to deal with
residents of the inner city than they were 20 years ago,
they are far from having totally bridged the chasm that
has separated them from minorities - especially blacks -
for over 200 years. There are still too few black officers, at
all levels. Racism still persists within contemporary police
departments.57
Former New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton ob-
serves, "As police leadership has accepted responsibility for re-
ducing crime and fear, so too must it accept responsibility for
dealing with racism, brutality, and inappropiate attitudes in the
ranks. The first step is to admit there is a problem."" The
Kennedy, Race, Crime and the Law at 118 (cited in note 19).
African Americans, who comprise 39 percent of Chicago's population, City of Chi-
cago, Population by Race at 24 (cited in note 14), constitute 26 percent of Chicago's sworn
police officers, 17 percent of its sergeants and 11 percent of its lieutenants. Chicago Police
Department Operational Report, Sworn Members by Race and Title (July 24, 1998).
Kennedy, Race, Crime and the Law at 120 (cited in note 19) (quoting the Christo-
pher Commission).
Id (summarizing the findings of the Christopher Commission).
Editorial, Slow Response on Police Misconduct, NY Times A24 (May 12, 1998).
s' Hubert Williams and Patrick V. Murphy, The Evolving Strategy of Police: A Mi-
nority View, in No. 13 Perspectives on Policing 12 (US Dept of Justice, Natl Inst of Justice
Jan 1990).
William Bratton, Turnaround 312 (Random House 1998). Bratton is a noted
champion of community policing, as is James Q. Wilson. Wilson recently observed:
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Meares-Kahan thesis - that legal safeguards should be relaxed
because things were even worse thirty years ago - is illogical
and misinformed.
Chicago residents who live with crime on a daily basis want
and deserve effective protection from gang intimidation and vio-
lence. But they have the right to insist that law enforcement
make use of laws that are reasonably specific and well-targeted,
not blank-check ordinances that grant sweeping, ill-defined pow-
ers to the police. Despite their broad demands for deference to
the will of "the community," Meares and Kahan ultimately agree
that law enforcement measures must satisfy a constitutional re-
quirement of guided discretion. This requirement in fact has al-
ways limited the power of the police. In the end their only com-
plaint is that they think the Chicago ordinance satisfies this re-
quirement, while the Illinois courts ruled that it does not.
Strangely, Meares and Kahan fail to discuss the terms of the or-
dinance that led the Illinois courts to hold it unconstitutional.
III. THE VAGUENESS OF THE ORDINANCE
Chicago's anti-loitering ordinance is riddled with ambiguous
directives and unhelpful, open-ended definitions. It defines loi-
tering as the act of "remain[ing] in one place with no apparent
purpose;" it provides that whenever an officer observes loitering
by a group of two or more individuals, any one of whom she rea-
sonably believes to be a gang member, she can order the entire
group to "disperse and remove themselves from the area."
The problems of interpretation are numerous: When is a
purpose "apparent"? Does any purpose, if apparent, render the
ordinance inapplicable - even a criminal purpose? If so, how
does the ordinance help to restrict gang activity? If not, what
principles determine which apparent purposes count? And what
does it mean to "disperse?" How large is the "area" that a person
ordered to disperse must leave? May this person ever come back?
We are at mid-stream in our efforts to produce a society in which whites
and blacks can live together decently well. Such a transformation is still
decades away, and in this time there will be more riots, more suspicion,
and more political manipulation. The vast gains that African Americans
have made .. . coexist with a deep layer of anger, distrust, and confusion
.... In the troubled meantime, it would be useful to remind ourselves
that... electoral politics often brings out the worst in us.
James Q. Wilson, The Closing of the American City, The New Republic 30, 38 (May 11,
1998).
Chicago Municipal Code § 8-4-015 (1992).
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If so, when and with whom? Can one be punished for unknowing
proximity to a gang member? Kahan and Meares discuss none of
these issues. Papachristou v Jacksonville' and a host of other
Supreme Court precedents make clear that a law framed in open-
ended terms of this sort is void for vagueness.
A. Papachristou in Perspective
For more than seventy years, the Supreme Court has in-
sisted that "a penal statute [must] define the criminal offense
with -sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited."' In addition, the Court has required
that offenses be defined "in a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." 2 Papachristou v
Jacksonville,' a straightforward application of these principles,
unanimously held void for vagueness a city ordinance that pun-
ished, among others, all "persons wandering or strolling around
from place to place without any lawful purpose.' 4
Meares and Kahan maintain that the Court's decision in Pa-
pachristou manifested the Burger Court's "community distrust"
and "discretion skepticism.' They write, "Each of these princi-
ples.., was clearly aimed at counteracting the distorting influ-
ence of institutionalized racism on America's criminal justice sys-
tem."66 At the time that Papachristou was decided, they say, "in-
stitutionalized racism fully justified the Court's suspicion of
democratic politics. " 7 Indeed, "[g]iven the nature of the problems
that then confronted African Americans . . . the conception of
rights embodied in Papachristou deserves admiration.' They
conclude, however, that "the law at issue in that case, as well as
the political and social dynamics of the time, do not map well onto
405 US 156 (1972).
6, Kolender v Lawson, 461 US 352, 357 (1983). See also Connally v General Con-
struction Co, 269 US 385, 391 (1926).
Kolender, 461 US at 357.
Papachristou v Jacksonville, 405 US 156, 162 (1972).
Idat 157n 1.
Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 205 (cited in note 5).
Id. Although the Court's opinion did not refer to the distorting influence of institu-
tionalized racism on America's criminal justice system, Meares and Kahan infer that this
racism was the Court's target because the Court mentioned that vague loitering ordi-
nances can be used to discriminate against groups that have incurred the displeasure of
the police and because Justice Douglas, the author of the Papachristou opinion, mentioned
in a 1960 law review article that people arrested for loitering and vagrancy often were




the contemporary circumstances against which [the cases invali-
dating Chicago's gang loitering ordinance] were decided."69 The
authors declare, "Papachristou's conception of rights is wrong for
the nineties."'0 They even suggest, astonishingly, that the Illinois
courts should not have followed the Supreme Court's decision:
These "courts should have upheld the gang loitering ordinance
whether or not it satisfied Papachristou's demand for hyper-
precision."7 '
Meares and Kahan's characterization of Papachristou as de-
manding "hyper-precision" and requiring "relentless judicial sec-
ond-guessing" 2  is puzzling. Far from demanding "hyper-
precision," Papachristou merely invalidated a municipal ordi-
nance whose language, Meares and Kahan themselves tell us,
"could easily be applied to any person, in any situation, at any
time, by any police officer.' 7
Papachristou, moreover, did not invent the "void for vague-
ness" doctrine, and the purpose of this doctrine was not to combat
institutionalized racism or black political disempowerment. Long
before 1972 - in 1926 in fact - the Supreme Court held that "a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 206 (cited in note 5).
: Id at 207.
Id at 211.
Id at 205, 211.
Meares and Kahan, U Chi Legal F at 206 (cited in note 5). Meares and Kahan
assert that the ordinance invalidated in Papachristou and the Chicago anti-loitering ordi-
nance are clearly different. Id. We disagree. In Papachristou the Supreme Court con-
demned Jacksonville's prohibition of "wandering or strolling around from place to place
without any lawful purpose or object." The Court remarked, "The qualification 'Without
any lawful purpose or object may be a trap for innocent acts." Papachristou, 405 US at
164. The Chicago ordinance declares, 'Loiter' means to remain in any one place with no
apparent purpose." Municipal Code of Chicago, § 8-4-015(c)(1). Remaining in one place is
as harmless as wandering, and the qualification "with no apparent purpose" is even more
vague and even more clearly a potential "trap for innocent acts' than the qualification
"without any lawful purpose." See Part III C. One commentator concludes that the Chi-
cago ordinance's "definition of loitering... does not adequately restrict the Ordinance's
scope. Specifically, this language appears indistinguishable from the language of the
Papachristou ordinance .... " Comment, Chicago's Ban on Gang Loitering: Making Sense
of Vagueness and Overbreadth in Loitering Laws, 83 Cal L Rev 379, 409-10 (1995).
Kahan and Meares offer two distinctions. First, they say, all police officers could
enforce the Jacksonville ordinance while only some officers were authorized to enforce the
Chicago ordinance. Second, they argue that police guidelines limit the reach of the Chi-
cago ordinance. Restricting the number of officers who can enforce an ordinance, however,
neither enhances the ability of citizens to know what is proscribed nor limits the discre-
tion of the officers authorized to enforce it. Being subjected to the whim of only some
police officers may not greatly improve the quality of life, especially when the authorized
officers are plentiful. Kahan and Meares emphasize the police guidelines but fail to men-
tion that the guidelines do not limit or clarify the ordinance's concept of "loitering" at all.
The guidelines are concerned entirely with other issues.
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terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
first essential of due process of law.' 4 And in 1939, in Lanzetta v
New Jersey,5 the Court applied this doctrine to strike down an
anti-gang statute in circumstances having nothing whatever to do
with racial oppression or political disenfranchisement. The Illi-
nois Supreme Court relied on Lanzetta as much as on Papachris-
tou when it held the Chicago ordinance invalid."
B. Unhelpful Guidelines
To support their claim that the Chicago ordinance is not
egregiously vague, Meares and Kahan point to Chicago Police
Department regulations that ostensibly limited the circum-
stances in which the ordinance would be enforced. Referring to
the decision in which the Illinois Supreme Court held the ordi-
nance invalid, they report, "The Morales court was [ ] dismissive
of the Chicago Police Department's efforts to guide the discretion
of enforcing officers, ignoring the promulgated regulations com-
pletely in the analysis of the ordinance's constitutionality."77
Meares and Kahan do not accurately describe the decision
they disparage. Far from "ignoring the promulgated regulations
completely," the Morales court concluded, first, that the police
had not followed the guidelines and, second, that even if they
had, the guidelines would not have remedied the vagueness of the
ordinance. The court noted that, while the ordinance requires a
police officer's reasonable belief that one person in a group of loi-
terers is a gang member, the regulations declare, "[M]embership
may not be established solely because an individual is wearing
clothing available for sale to the general public.'s The officer
who arrested the defendant Jesus Morales testified, however,
that his only reason for concluding that Morales was a gang
member was that the suspect wore black and blue, colors which
the officer associated with the Gangster Disciples gang.79
The Illinois Supreme Court also stressed a more important
Connally v General Construction Co, 269 US 385, 391 (1926). See also United
States v Reese, 92 US 214, 221 (1875) ("It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature
could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to
step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.").
306 US 451 (1939).
7' Meares and Kahan do not discuss whether, under their theory, Lanzetta, Connally,
Kolender and other Supreme Court "void for vagueness" decisions are outdated.
Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 201 (cited in note 5).
78 Chicago Police Department, General Order No 92-4 (1992).
City of Chicago v Morales, 687 NE2d 53, 64 n 1 (Ill 1997).
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reason for the insufficiency of the guidelines. It noted that "the
general police order.., does absolutely nothing to cure the im-
precisions of the definition of the 'loitering' element of the
crime."8' The regulations were concerned only with identifying
(a) the neighborhoods in which the ordinance would be enforced,
(b) what officers would enforce it, (c) what groups would be
treated as gangs, and (d) what individuals would be treated as
gang members. The Illinois Supreme Court held the anti-
loitering ordinance unconstitutional, however, because its concept
of loitering was incomprehensible. The police guidelines did
nothing to remedy this defect.8'
C. Imperceptible Purposes and Undecipherable Law
In Papachristou, the Supreme Court noted two reasons for
the constitutional requirement that criminal law be comprehen-
sible. It said, "This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the
sense that it 'fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,'
... and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and
convictions."82 The loitering provisions of the Chicago ordinance
fall far short of satisfying either goal of the due process require-
ment.
Under the ordinance, a person may be ordered to disperse
(and arrested if she fails to comply) whenever she is "loitering"
with a person whom a police officer reasonably believes to be a
gang member. The ordinance declares, "'Loiter[ing]' means to
remain in any one place with no apparent purpose."' One com-
mentator notes that when statutes define loitering in terms of the
absence of a proper purpose, they "have consistently been found
unconstitutional."'84
Youths standing on a streetcorner to plot crimes, sell drugs,
hassle women, bully men, drink whiskey, discuss the Chicago
Bulls, exchange witticisms, bond with one another, philosophize
about life, view the passing scene, panhandle, recite poetry, learn
Id at 64.
8, Meares and Kahan declare that the anti-loitering ordinance "was implemented
through regulations that clearly defined... 'loitering'... ." Meares and Kahan, 1998 U
Chi Legal F at 211 (cited in note 5). This statement is incorrect. The regulations contain
no language purporting to clarify or define the term "loitering." They are concerned with
other issues exclusively.
Papachristou v Jacksonville, 405 US 156, 162 (1972) (quoting United States v Har-
riss, 347 US 612, 617 (1954)).
Municipal Code of Chicago, § 8-4-015(c)(1).
Comment, 83 Cal L Rev at 400 (cited in note 73).
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where the action is, shoot craps, breakdance, break windows,
catch a bus, escape the heat of a tenement, assist the elderly, or
praise Mayor Daley all have their purposes. Their purposes may
or may not be apparent. When the purposes of people on the
streetcorner are apparent, they sometimes include disrupting a
neighborhood and dealing drugs. People with these apparent
purposes presumably are close to the top of the list of people the
Chicago City Council would like the police to disperse. The
Council, however, enacted an ordinance that, taken literally, de-
nies the police the power to disperse them. No one in public with
an "apparent purpose," however dreadful this purpose may be, is
in violation of the ordinance. Under the ordinance, however, peo-
ple with harmless or noble purposes who fail to make these pur-
poses apparent can be ordered to disperse (and arrested if they
fail to comply) whenever they are knowingly or unknowingly in
the company of a reputed gang member.
For example, when a reputed gang member sits on a lengthy
park bench, he may be joined by a jogger taking a rest and then
in turn by a person waiting for a taxi, a social science researcher
from the University of Chicago, a reporter for the Chicago Trib-
une, a United States Supreme Court Justice, 5 and a teacher who
has come to plead with the reputed gang member to return to
school. Under the ordinance, a police officer who comes upon the
scene and cannot discern the purpose of anyone on the bench (but
who recognizes the suspected gang member) may order them all
to leave. The officer then may arrest the bench-sitters if they re-
fuse to comply or if they return to the park too soon. A judge may
sentence each of the people on the bench to six months in jail.
Of course the Chicago anti-loitering ordinance was not meant
to be, and never would be, taken so literally. When this ordi-
nance is not taken literally, however, its audiences - both the
consumers and the enforcers of law - cannot know what it
means. And when police officers cannot know what a loitering
ordinance means, they are likely to tailor its contents to the exi-
gencies of the moment as they see them. The "law in action" then
may be what the City Council probably wanted it to be. In the
anti-loitering ordinance, the Council effectively awarded the po-
lice a hassling licence with teeth." As the Illinois Supreme Court
We realize that this part of our hypothetical is unrealistic.
Meares and Kahan say that "those who object to the gang loitering ordinance...
are mistaken when they argue that the ordinance broadens police discretion." Meares and
Kahan, U Chi Legal F at 213 (cited in note 5). They quote Debra Livingston (who was
quoting Jerry Mashaw) for the proposition that "[e]limination of discretion at one choice
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noted, the ordinance was "drafted in an intentionally vague man-
ner so that persons who are undesirable in the eyes of police and
prosecutors can be convicted even though they are not chargeable
with any particular offense."'7
Under the Chicago ordinance, a police officer must direct a
person to disperse before arresting her, and the officer's order
may provide a kind of personalized notice prior to arrest. Never-
theless, an order that leaves at large both the boundaries of the
area a person must vacate and the circumstances under which
she may return is itself too vague to support the imposition of
criminal punishment. As we will explain in greater detail, rather
than provide fair warning, the order to disperse can easily be-
come an unfair trap set by the police.
Moreover, the police order obviously provides no notice prior
to the order itself. An order to leave the sidewalk burdens consti-
tutional rights and withdraws one of the ordinary comforts of life,
and the imposition of this constraint requires notice and stan-
dards. In Shuttlesworth v Birmingham," the Supreme Court
considered an ordinance that made it "unlawful for any person to
stand or loiter upon any street or sidewalk... after having been
requested by any police officer to move on."9 The Court observed
that, if this ordinance meant what it appeared to say, it would be
clearly unconstitutional. In the Court's words, an ordinance that
allows a person to "stand on a public sidewalk ... only at the
whim of any police officer" is unconstitutional.' The Court up-
held the ordinance only because local courts had limited its appli-
cation to people who impeded the passage of others." Similarly,
in Coates v Cincinnati,92 the Court declared an ordinance uncon-
stitutionally vague "because it subjects the exercise of the right of
point merely causes the discretion that had been exercised there to migrate elsewhere in
the system." Id at 214 (quoting Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life
in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum L Rev 551, 593
(1997)).
Although we recognize the often hydraulic character of discretion in the criminal
justice system, we doubt that efforts at legislative precision are futile. If Meares and
Kahan's bottom line is simply that discretion will migrate and cops will be cops, they
ought to urge abandonment of the vagueness doctrine and of all law purporting to restrict
the police. Their own recommendations of "guided discretion" and police regulations
would seem to be doomed.
Morales, 687 NE2d at 64.
382 US 87 (1965).
Id at 88.
Id at 90.
" Id at 91. The Chicago gang loitering ordinance has not been given, and is not sus-
ceptible to, the construction that saved the ordinance in Shuttlesworth.
92 402 US 611 (1971).
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assembly to an unascertainable standard." 3
The Illinois Appellate Court found the anti-loitering ordi-
nance overbroad and invalid under the First Amendment as well
as unconstitutionally vague and invalid under the Due Process
Clause.' A gang member's mother has a constitutional right to
speak to him in public, urging him to reconsider his wayward
conduct and its harmful effect on family members and others. In
Chicago, however, unless the mother's purpose is "apparent," she
can be ordered not to do it. This illustration is only one of count-
less situations in which people have a right to speak to or assem-
ble in public with people whom they know to be gang members.
Under the Chicago ordinance, moreover, people can be or-
dered off a sidewalk even when they have no reason to know that
they are in the company of a gang member. The ordinance pro-
vides, "Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he rea-
sonably believes to be a criminal street gang member loitering in
any public place with one or more other persons, he shall order
all such persons to disperse and remove themselves from the
area."5 The Illinois Supreme Court observed that "[a]n individ-
ual standing on a street corner with a group of people has no way
of knowing whether an approaching police officer has a reason-
able belief that the group contains a member of a criminal street
gang, "96 and the Illinois Appellate Court declared that ordering
non-gang members to disperse simply because they are unknow-
ingly in the presence of a gang member "smacks of a police-state
tactic and clearly violates the first amendment rights of the inno-
cent persons."
The ordinance's declaration that one may not stand near a
reputed gang member even unknowingly may not be vague, but
this prohibition is constitutionally defective for the same reason
that vague criminal prohibitions are. Under the ordinance, a
person has no way of conforming her behavior to the require-
ments of law and no way of knowing whether a police order to
Id at 614. The ordinance made it illegal for 'three or more persons to assemble [in
public and] .. . conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by. . . ." Id
at 611.
Chicago v Youkhana, 660 NE2d 34, 38-39 (IIl App 1995).
9 Municipal Code of Chicago, § 8-4-015(a) (emphasis added).
Morales, 687 NE2d at 62.
Youkhana, 660 NE2d at 38. Meares and Kahan quote the court's reference to "a
police state tactic" without revealing the aspect of the ordinance that prompted the use of
this strong language. Perhaps they consider the language hyperbolic, but they neither
respond to nor acknowledge the court's first amendment concerns. See Meares and Ka-
han, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 201 (cited in note 5).
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disperse is valid.98 As a commentator on the Chicago ordinance
observed, "Laws cannot constitutionally require people to have
psychic powers .... '9
D. The Relocation Trap
The ordinance's broadest grant of discretion to police officers
does not arise from its incomprehensible definition of loitering or
its prohibition of even unknowing proximity to a reputed gang
member. It lies in the almost unfettered power of an arresting
officer to determine whether a suspect has adequately complied
with a police order to disperse.
People could usually avoid liability under traditional anti-
loitering laws simply by "moving along.""°  Not so under Chi-
cago's ordinance, which permits the police to order loiterers to do
something more - "disperse and remove themselves from the
area."'0 ' The ordinance adds, "Any person who does not promptly
obey such an order is in violation of this section." 2 None of the
crucial terms - "disperse," "the area," and "obey" - is defined by
the ordinance or addressed in any police department regulation.
In practice, these terms have proven exceptionally elastic.
The Chicago Sun-Times, citing Police Department statistics,
noted that during the period between enactment of the ordinance
in 1992 and its invalidation by the Appellate Court in 1995, the
ordinance was "used to arrest 41,740 people and disperse 43,457
others.103 Although the ordinance was ostensibly enforced only
Compare Lambert v California, 355 US 225, 230 (1957) (notice is not provided by a
law "written in print too fine to read or in a language foreign to the community"). The
Chicago ordinance's prohibition of unknowing proximity to a person reasonably believed to
be a gang member is enforced initially, not by a criminal sanction, but by an order to re-
move oneself from the area. This police-imposed sanction is not trivial, especially since
both the area from which one is banished and the length of the banishment remain un-
specified. See Part III D.
Note, The Troubled Constitutionality of Antigang Loitering Laws, 69 Chi-Kent L
Rev 461, 486-87 (1993). The police guidelines require department officials to maintain a
file on suspected gang members but prohibit disclosure of this information to the public.
Chicago Police Department, General Order No 92-4 at §§ III; IIIA. Ironically (albeit for
good reason), the guidelines prevent the police from giving the notice that might make
compliance with the ordinance possible.
" See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Part II, Com-
ment to §250.6 at 387-90 (1980).
101 Municipal Code of Chicago, § 8-4-015 (a).
10 Id.
" Michael Gillis and Fran Spielman, City's Loitering Law Ruled Unconstitutional,
Chi Sun-Times 3 (Dec 19, 1995). In a more recent report, the Chicago Police Department
put the number of arrests at a slightly higher figure - 42,967. Chicago Police Depart-
ment, Gang and Narcotic Related Violent Crime, City of Chicago, 1993-1997 at 7 (June
1998).
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in "certain areas of police districts with demonstrated gang prob-
lems,"'" one should note that the number of African American
males aged fifteen to twenty-four, inclusive, who resided in the
entire city of Chicago was 88,053 in 1990.05 One may note, too,
that in 1972, at the time of the Papachristou decision, the total
number of vagrancy arrests annually throughout the United
States was about 100,000. The Supreme Court apparently cited
this figure because, to the Court, the number seemed large." If
the ordinance was indeed enforced by only a "small group of offi-
cers,"107 these officers did keep busy.'
The large number of loitering arrests may seem surprising
partly because the ordinance permits the arrest only of people
who fail to obey a police order "to disperse and remove them-
selves from the area." One wonders whether tens of thousands of
Chicago youth proved so defiant of police authority, so fond of the
food at the Cook County Jail, or so dedicated to civil liberties
that, rather than obey an order to disperse, they stood their
ground and submitted to arrest."9
Our conversations with a public defender who represented
"1 See Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 200 (cited in note 5).
" United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of
Population: General Population Characteristics for Illinois (CP-1-15) at Table 61 (City of
Chicago African American Population - Age Groups). Of course we understand that not
everyone arrested for violating the anti-loitering ordance was black or male or between
the ages of fifteen and twenty-four, and we also understand that some people may have
been arrested repeatedly. Our purpose is not to determine the percentage of young black
men who were arrested for violating the ordinance but simply to gain some rough perspec-
tive on the arrest statistics.
1" Papachristou v Jacksonville, 405 US 156, 169 n 15 (1972).
10" See Kahan and Meares, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 206 (cited in note 5).
" There is no reason to believe that only a small group of officers were authorized to
enforce the ordinance. Meares and Kahan report, "General Order 92-4, authorized only
gang tactical unit officers and other youth officers - those assumed to have the greatest
knowledge of Chicago's criminal street gangs - to enforce the new ordinance." Id at 200
(emphasis added). These claims are inaccurate, as they overlook critical language in the
relevant portion of the order: "Only sworn members of the Gang Crime Section, district
tactical units and other personnel designated by an exempt member of the Department may
arrest members of criminal street gangs who violate the provisions of Section 8-4-015 of
the MCC." Chicago Police Department, General Order No 92-4 at § 111(c) (emphasis
added). Lee Carson, a public defender who represented many gang loitering defendants,
reports that by at least 1995 every Chicago patrol officer in the districts in which the
ordinance was enforced considered herself authorized to make gang loitering arrests.
Telephone interview, July 29, 1998. Meares and Kahan present no evidence to support
their view that only a "small group" of Chicago police officers was authorized to arrest
violators of the ordinance. [Editor's Note: The University of Chicago Legal Forum does not
verify telephone interviews.]
0 One common response of young people to the appearance of the police - flight -
would appear to constitute speedy (or perhaps even anticipatory) compliance with an
order to disperse.
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gang-loitering defendants (Lee Carson)"' and a prosecutor who
prosecuted them (Abigail Abraham)"' suggest a different expla-
nation. Both report that the police usually "shagged" suspected
loiterers off streetcorners without difficulty. In other words, ac-
cused loiterers promptly obeyed police orders to disperse. Min-
utes or hours later, however, an officer might observe a person he
had previously ordered to leave the area. This person might not
be close to the same streetcorner. He might not still be loitering
with the same group or with anyone in it. He might even be
alone. The officer, however, would arrest this accused loiterer for
failing to "obey" the order to "disperse" and "remove himself from
the area."
We do not contend that this police practice violated the ordi-
nance. In most cases, there is no way to tell whether it did or not.
We agree with the police that one does not obey an order to leave
an area by departing only long enough for the police to disappear,
then resuming the same "loitering" activity. The critical question
in the enforcement of the anti-loitering ordinance, however, is left
unanswered by the ordinance itself: How much more does it take?
An order to remove oneself from "the area" presumably is not
satisfied just by crossing the street. Equally clearly, the order
does not require a loiterer to leave the city. Between these points
lies a murky range of possibilities that the ordinance commits to
the arresting officer's discretion. Is a removal of one block suffi-
cient, or does removal require two blocks, five, or ten? Is the or-
der satisfied by going inside - say, at a pool hall open to the
public - or must everyone simply go home?
When a group of twelve reputed Disciples is ordered to "dis-
perse," may no member of the group lawfully remain in the com-
pany of any other member? Or may two members of the group
proceed together to a McDonalds restaurant a few blocks away?"
What if all twelve go to the restaurant?
Similarly, an order to disperse presumably is .not satisfied by
a one-minute departure, but the order does not banish a loiterer
from the street forever. May someone who has been ordered to
"remove himself' return a half-hour later to the area from which
"' Telephone interviews on June 3 and July 29, 1998.
.. Telephone interview on May 21, 1998. Abraham, an Assistant State's Attorney,
prosecuted some gang-loitering defendants in the Juvenile Division of the Cook County
Circuit Court. Members of the Corporation Counsel's Office prosecuted defendants over
seventeen years of age in the Municipal Division of the Circuit Court.
"' A restaurant appears to qualify as a "public place" under the ordinance. See Mu-
nicipal Code of the City of Chicago, § 8-4-015(c)(5) (defining "public place7 as any "location
open to the public, whether publicly or privately owned").
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he was banished? Two hours later? Or twelve?
The ordinance leaves all of these issues to the unguided dis-
cretion of arresting police officers. In most cases, moreover, the
arresting officer serves in practice as the accused loiterer's final
judge and jury. We were unable to determine how many of Chi-
cago's gang-loitering arrests led to either convictions or acquit-
tals. We did, however, seek this information from the office of the
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Administrative
Office of the Illinois Courts, the office of the Corporation Counsel
of the City of Chicago, and the office of the Cook County State's
Attorney. Lee Carson, the public defender with whom we spoke,
estimated that only about five percent of all loitering arrests led
to either guilty pleas or trials; he reported that the overwhelming
majority of loitering prosecutions were dismissed. None of the
other sources we contacted contradicted Carson's picture of the
processing of these cases.
Most of the reasons given for the dismissal of loitering cases
by prosecutors seem legitimate.113 Mass dismissals nevertheless
underscore the fact that, in the administration of Chicago's anti-
loitering ordinance (as in the administration of many other public
order offenses), the most significant sanctions often are: (1) the
arrest itself, (2) the search incident to arrest which may enable
the police to charge the suspect with a drug or weapons offense;
and (3) the period spent in jail before the suspect appears in
court. In the words of the title of a classic study, "the process is
113 Many dismissals occurred simply because a substantial majority of the trial judges
who considered the issue held Chicago's anti-loitering ordinance unconstitutional. See
note 115 and accompanying text. Prosecutors could not influence the assignment of cases
to courtrooms, and when loitering cases were assigned to the courtrooms of judges who
had held the ordinance invalid, prosecutors had little choice but to dismiss.
In addition, some - but not all - of the judges who upheld the ordinance (or who
had not ruled on its constitutionality) imposed a heavy burden of proof on prosecutors.
They not only required prosecutors to establish a police officer's reasonable belief that a
loiterer was a member of, say, the Gangster Disciples (which often was not easy); they also
required prosecutors to establish (in every case) that the Gangster Disciples fit the anti-
loitering ordinance's definition of a criminal street gang. Prosecutors were required to
demonstrate that the Disciples had three or more members, that members had committed
at least two criminal acts of a kind specified in the ordinance, that the members had com-
mitted these criminal acts as gang members, that two of the acts had occurred within five
years of one another, and that one of the acts had occurred after the effective date of the
anti-loitering ordinance. See Municipal Code of Chicago, § 8-4-015(c)(2)-(cX4). Prosecu-
tors did try to meet these burdens - but only sometimes - and when the proof was un-
available, they dismissed.
When a search incident to an arrest for loitering revealed drugs or weapons, sus-
pects were charged with offenses more serious than loitering, and prosecutors usually saw
no reason to pursue the loitering charges.
Finally, some prosecutors in both the Corporation Counsel's Office and the State's
Attorney's Office had no personal interest in enforcing the ordinance.
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the punishment.""4 The punishers are the police.
Before three justices of the Illinois Appellate Court and seven
justices of the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously held the anti-
loitering ordinance unconstitutional, twelve judges of the Circuit
Court of Cook County, each ruling in a different case, declared
the ordinance invalid. Three Circuit Court judges upheld the or-
dinance in other cases, and one judge held the ordinance constitu-
tional as applied to people whom the police reasonably considered
gang members and unconstitutional as applied to others."' The
two published law review commentaries on the ordinance both
conclude that, in the words of one of them, "[t]he Chicago anti-
gang loitering ordinance clearly violates the vagueness
doctrine.""'
E. The Sounds of Silence
Although Meares and Kahan repudiate a remarkable con-
sensus of legal opinion, their article does not discuss any of the
vagueness or overbreadth issues considered above and empha-
sized in the judicial opinions they reject. Meares and Kahan
simply do not address the constitutionality of ordering people to
disperse who are unwittingly in the presence of a gang member,
nor do they consider the meaning of "loitering," "no apparent
purpose," "disperse," "remove," "the area," and "obey."
Perhaps Meares and Kahan consider these issues prosaic.
They hope to lead courts to "a different and updated conception of
rights""7 and "an alternative way of thinking about protecting
rights - an approach that takes into account contemporary social
and political circumstances." 8
114 See Malcolm Feeley, The Process Is the Punishment (Russell Sage 1979).
' Comment, 83 Cal L Rev at 384 n 26 (cited in note 73). This comment cites the split
decision, Chicago v Pineda, No. 94-MC1-290636 (Ill Cir 1994), ten Illinois Circuit Court
decisions invalidating the ordinance, and two decisions upholding it. Lee Carson reports
that between the completion of the comment and the ruling of the Illinois Appellate Court,
six more Circuit Court judges held the ordinance invalid, and one more judge upheld it.
Carson observes that we live at a time when a signifcant number of elected judges
have lost their offices for "soft on crime" votes. He says that, especially in view of Mayor
Daley's support for the ordinance, most of the judges who voted to hold it invalid did not
enhance their political prospects by doing so. He describes the judges' rulings as a testa-
ment to their willingness to follow the law even at some potential personal price. Tele-
phone interviews on June 3 and July 29, 1998.
1"' Note, 69 Chi-Kent L Rev at 485 (cited in note 99). See also Comment, 83 Cal L Rev
379 (cited in note 73).
.. Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 211 (cited in note 5).
.I. Id at 198.
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We offer a few comments about Meares and Kahan's conception of
rights in the section that follows.
IV. A NEW CONCEPT OF RIGHTS OR VANISHING RIGHTS? - THE
PLIABLE RHETORIC OF COMMUNITY
Meares and Kahan see the Constitution as a chameleon.
They argue that what was unconstitutional in 1972 has become
constitutional today and that loitering ordinances that were
properly invalidated then should now be upheld. Indeed, judicial
views that were "fully justified"" 9 only twenty-six years ago and
that deserved "admiration" then 2 ° now reflect "an anachronistic
and unduly abstract understanding of individual rights." 2' Ac-
cording to Meares and Kahan, the constitutional rights of 1972
grew out of judicial concern about the institutionalized racism of
an era now behind us. Those rights were right for 1972, but they
are "wrong for the nineties."
122
Meares and Kahan explain, "A 1990s conception of rights
should follow two principles: community burden sharing and
guided discretion."" Part III of this article indicated the sort of
"guided discretion" that Meares and Kahan would provide. Tak-
ing Chicago's anti-loitering ordinance as their paradigm, they
would approve vast discretion and provide almost no guidance.
Part II of this article showed that the argument Meares and
Kahan offer for abandoning the 1972 (and the 1939 and the 1926)
conception of rights rests on a nonsequitur. Whether African
Americans have made more than symbolic progress in the politi-
cal arena since 1972 is debatable. But even if the gains of recent
decades are properly characterized as substantial, these gains
have left African Americans far short of parity. Anyone who con-
tends that the "institutionalized racism" of American police de-
partments has vanished does not read the newspapers.' And
even full implementation of the political rights of a racial minor-
"' Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 205 (cited in note 5).
'2 Id at 206.
121 Id at 198.
'2 Id at 207.
Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 209 (cited in note 5).
Any court willing to accept the Meares-Kahan approach presumably would have to
afford the parties before it the opportunity to litigate such issues as whether and how
much African American political power has increased in the city, county or state in ques-
tion, and whether and how much systemic racism has diminished. We doubt the institu-
tional capacity of courts to determine and redetermine, case-by case, the issues that the
Meares-Kahan approach would make dispositive. See notes 49-58 and accompanying
text.
BEDROCKR hG-TS
ity would provide no justification for limiting this minority's civil
liberties.
Part I of this article emphasized that the community Meares
and Kahan portray as offering to "share the burden" has not
agreed to any such thing. Large portions of Chicago's African
American community emphatically opposed the city's anti-
loitering ordinance, and most African American Aldermen did not
support it. Even Meares and Kahan's new conception of rights
would not save the ordinance.
In this final section, we view Meares and Kahan's new con-
ception of rights from a broader perspective. Even in a hypo-
thetical world in which their factual assumptions could be sup-
ported, their concept of rights would present insurmountable dif-
ficulties.
A. Burden Sharing When the Polity and the Community
Correspond
We begin with a situation that the Meares-Kahan conception
of rights makes easy: The democratically elected legislature of a
city, state, or nation (or, even better, a majority of the citizens of
this political unit themselves) unmistakably supports a restric-
tion of rights, and the burdens of this restriction fall more-or-less
evenly throughout the jurisdiction.
A 1989 Washington Post-ABC News poll provides an illustra-
tion, one that seems as close to full community burden-sharing as
any limitation of rights in the real world could. This poll found
that 55 percent of 764 adult respondents favored mandatory drug
testing for all Americans." Because everyone would share the
burden of the mandatory testing and officials would have no dis-
cretion, the Kahan-Meares conception of rights makes further
analysis unnecessary. The new conception of rights would allow
the mandatory drug testing of everyone.
The same poll found that 67 percent of adults favor drug
tests for all high school students. This measure would pass the
elastic Meares-Kahan burden-sharing test for the same reason
they say that gang-loitering ordinances do: Although most high
school students are disenfranchised, "it is critical to understand
that this minority is by no means despised .... [Tleens and even
gang members are linked to the majority by strong social and fa-
" Richard Morin, Many in Poll Say Bush Plan Is Not Stringent Enough, Mandatory
Drug Tests, Searches Backed, Wash Post Al, A18 (Sept 8, 1989).
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milial ties."'26
In 1990, Georgia legislators enacted a statute requiring can-
didates for public office to take drug tests before being listed on
the ballot in future elections. The legislators included themselves
in the shared community burden. This statute offered so few
benefits in return for its intrusion upon privacy that in 1997 the
Supreme Court, with only one justice dissenting, held it unconsti-
tutional.' The burden-sharing concept apparently would require
the opposite result.
Indeed, majority support for many of the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights seems ephemeral,'" and the Meares-Kahan concep-
tion of rights could make many familiar freedoms disappear. The
authors' error, however, is apparent: Our Constitution does not
permit a majority to limit individual rights simply by offering to
share the burden. The "sharing" is inherently unequal whenever
some dissenters are unwilling to bear the burden because they
value more than others their privacy, their right to speak, or
their freedom to stand on a public sidewalk and chat with friends.
B. Burden Sharing When the Relevant Community Is Not
Co-extensive With the Formal Political Community
The Meares-Kahan conception of rights would make constitu-
tional law easy in the sort of case just described - one in which a
law enacted by a democratic legislature imposes burdens that are
shared by nearly all of the people of a city, state, or nation. In
most cases, however, constitutional law would become more diffi-
cult.
Meares and Kahan do not maintain that the "burden-
sharing" requirement is satisfied simply because an ordinance is
enacted by a political majority. They see rights from the perspec-
tive of groups within political communities. But groups do not
come predetermined. Identifying the groups most affected by a
restriction of rights, determining the boundaries of these groups,
and assessing the views of people within them would be formida-
ble tasks.
For example, Meares and Kahan declare that Chicago's anti-
12 Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 210 (cited in note 5).
Chandler v Miller, 520 US 305 (1997).
' Sixty-seven percent of respondents to the poll cited above favored the random
stopping and searching of cars for drugs, and 71 percent favored prohibiting the depiction
of illegal drug use in movies. See Morin, Bush Plan Not Stringent Enough, Wash Post at
A18 (cited in note 125).
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loitering ordinance had "critical support of the leaders of the
highest crime (and mostly minority) wards."129 They offer no ex-
planation for their shift of focus from support by minority groups
to support by "high crime" neighborhoods. Which community
counts - the minority community or the residents of the highest
crime wards? And what procedures should be used to sort
through the conflicting preferences held by members of either one
of these groups? Meares and Kahan make no reference to the
intense disagreements within these communities and provide no
evidence to support their claim that the anti-loitering ordinance
garnered majority support in either the "high-crime" or the Afri-
can American wards.3 '
These are the least of the difficulties. Should one speak of
the "minority community" without dividing it, or should one
speak of Chicago's Latino community or, more narrowly, of its
Mexican-American community? Or should one speak only of par-
ticular Mexican-American neighborhoods? If the residents of one
Mexican-American neighborhood favor vague loitering ordinances
and the residents of another do not, would vague loitering ordi-
nances be constitutional in one neighborhood but not the other?
If most of a city's homeowners favor loitering ordinances but most
of its youth do not, would an ambiguous loitering ordinance be
enforceable against homeowners but not against juveniles? If the
residents of a neighborhood were unanimous in supporting a
vague loitering ordinance, would the ordinance be enforceable
" Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal Forum at 199 (cited in note 5).
" The only source cited in support of their claim is an unfootnoted and undocu-
mented opinion piece authored by themselves. For discussion of the available evidence,
see note 35. The phrasing of the Meares and Kahan contention about "the highest crime
(and mostly minority) wards" is especially puzzling because crime rates are not available
by wards. The boundaries of Chicago's twenty-five police districts do not correspond even
roughly to the boundaries of its fifty wards, and we know of no systematic way to deter-
mine which are the "highest crime" wards. The effect of the awkward Meares-Kahan
phrase is to preserve some link to their discussion of African American opinion, without
making a falsifiable claim about the actual level of support among African American al-
dermen.
Meares and Kahan reiterate their contention in the following sentence: "And in
Chicago, while crime rates nationally have been declining steadily over the last decade,
they have increased in the city's highest crime communities - the same communities
whose Aldermen promoted the gang loitering ordinance." Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi
Legal F at 208-09 & n 58. Again, we cannot determine the communities to which Meares
and Kahan. The news story they cite to support their assertion of increased crime rates in
Chicago's highest crime communities mentions only a higher homicide rate in one Chicago
police district. Of course, even when crime rates are falling, it is not difficult to find a few
districts that run counter to the trend. Meares and Kahan do not indicate how many such
districts there were, and one example does not suggest any correlation between these
districts and Aldermanic support for the anti-loitering ordinance.
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against individuals who pass through that neighborhood but live
in a part of the city where residents oppose the ordinance? If the
courts commissioned public opinion polls to resolve the burden-
sharing issues posed by the 1990s concept of rights, would they
poll ethnic group by ethnic group, ward by ward, block by block,
apartment complex by apartment complex, building by building,
floor by floor, or apartment by apartment? "Community-based"
approaches of this sort deny our common citizenship.
Race is obviously important, but neither courts nor legal
scholars have the right to cast an individual as a member of an
"African American group" rather than some other group that this
individual might consider more central to her identity. Neither
race nor geography fully defines a person's communities. Com-
munity identity is likely to depend on varied characteristics in
varied combinations - religion, race, ethnicity, residence, wealth,
gender, sexual orientation, occupation, physical disability, age,
and (especially in Chicago) political party and ward organization.
Chicago's communities are in fact innumerable. They include its
African American community, its West Side residents, its resi-
dents of the Austin neighborhood, its residents of high-crime
neighborhoods, its academic community, its teenagers, its Bap-
tists, its homeless, its residents of public housing, its Gangster
Disciples, its union members, its lawyers, its elderly, its gays and
lesbians, its Irish-Americans, its model train enthusiasts, its
ACLU members, its Cubs fans, and on and on.
There is usually no way for outsiders to determine which
communities are most affected by a legislative measure, to decide
which communities count more than others, to mark the bounda-
ries of informal, unorganized communities, or to assess the domi-
nant sentiment of community members. The concept of commu-
nity thus provides almost limitless opportunities for creative re-
definition and manipulation.''
Meares and Kahan recognize, for example, that Chicago's
anti-loitering ordinance was aimed primarily at disenfranchised
youths whom many older people regard as troublemakers. They
nevertheless contend that the ordinance satisfies the burden-
sharing concept because nearly all African Americans have a
sense of racial identity or "linked fate" and because even gang
members are not "despised" and "are linked to the majority by
strong social and familial ties.""2 They insist that the Illinois
See generally Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism (Harvard 1993).
Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 210 (cited in note 5). Meares and Ka-
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Supreme Court erred by "second-guess[ing] the community's de-
termination that such measures enhance rather than detract
from liberty."'33 Yet they offer no evidence that the preferences of
Chicago's adult voters reliably mirror the preferences of its youth,
and common sense (along with a wealth of data) suggests that
among minority males, attitudes toward the police differ dra-
matically along age lines.'" If the disenfranchised need be con-
sulted directly only when they are "despised" or when they have
no social ties to those who are privileged to vote, political safe-
guards will be pallid indeed. The next step might be to say if you
hate the sin but love the sinner,'35 you can share her burden. The
plasticity of Kahan and Meares's communitarian rhetoric is ap-
parent.
CONCLUSION
In 1693, court officials in Philadelphia responded to com-
plaints about the congregating and traveling of blacks
without their masters by authorizing the constables and
citizens of the city to "take up" any black person seen
"gadding abroad" without a pass from his or her master.
Of course the order to stop and detain any Negro found on
the street did not distinguish between free and enslaved
blacks.'36
Even in 1693, the sentiment that generated Meares and Ka-
han's "new conception of rights" was very old. In Papachristou,
the Supreme Court traced this sentiment to the English Statutes
of Laborers in 1349 and 1350, and it surely was old then.'37 When
people become frustrated and impatient, they are tempted to un-
han imply that if only the police could remove young men from streetcorners, they would
not need to arrest them later. See id at 213. They also declare that legislatures would
sense less need to increase criminal penalties. See id ("When courts strike down crime-
preventive measures such as the ordinance, legislatures inevitably attempt to compensate
with even more severe prison terms."). We are dubious about these propositions, and
Meares and Kahan provide no empirical support.
'33 Id at 210.
'" Samuel Walker, Cassia Spohn, and Miriam DeLone, The Color of Justice: Race,
Ethnicity, and Crime in America 89-91 (Wadsworth 1996).
" Compare The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations 37(8), Angela Partington, ed (Oxford
4th ed 1992). What Augustine really said was, "Cum dilectione hominum et odio vi-
tiorum," or "With love for mankind and hatred of sins."
'" Tracey Macin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 Vand L Rev 333, 334 (1998)
(citing A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., In the Matter of Color 276 (Oxford 1978)).
" Papachristou v Jacksonville, 405 US 156, 161 n3 (1972). See also American Law
Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Part II, at 383-84 (ALI 1980).
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leash govenmental power. They may conclude, "The sheriff
knows who the troublemakers are. Just let him round them up."
As this article has shown, large numbers of African Ameri-
can citizens and most of Chicago's elected African American Al-
dermen have resisted this sentiment. Yet our times and those
preferences could change. Fortunately, in both 1791 and 1868,
the Framers of our Constitution guarded against the old senti-
ment, "unbridle the sheriff," with an old conception of rights - a
concept commonly traced to the Magna Charta of 1215. At the
core of this concept, due process, is a requirement of notice and
fair warning. By approving it, the Framers made it difficult for
all Americans, whatever their races and whatever their commu-
nities, to yield to the fears that generated the English Statutes of
Laborers, Philadelphia's 1693 prohibition of "gadding abroad" by
Negroes, and Chicago's anti-loitering ordinance of 1992. The rea-
son for the Framers' endorsement of an old conception of rights
was not their fear of institutionalized racism."8 It was their
dread of tyranny. They enacted a Constitution that guaranteed
rights, not to collectivities, but to individuals.
Many of them in fact were slaveowners.
